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Abstract
The greater volatility and higher prices in the oil market after 2003 suggest the possi-
bility of increased speculation. Many researchers have investigated the origin of this
change in oil price dynamics. The literature, however, lacks a comprehensive empiri-
cal model of oil price dynamics that incorporates both fundamentals and the inﬂuence
of all economic agents who behave speculatively, and is also able to distinguish be-
tween speculation which is necessary for the oil market and “excess speculation”.
The ﬁrst chapter introduces a comprehensive empirical model which incorporates all
of these elements, and uses it to examine the contribution of fundamentals and excess
speculation to oil price ﬂuctuations. I do this by introducing three novel features
to the literature. First, I introduce an operational deﬁnition for excess speculation.
Second, using a dynamic common factor model, I extract orthogonal factors from
monthly time-series data that are speciﬁc to economic fundamentals and purely spec-
ulative activities, respectively, and decompose the variance of oil prices using these
orthogonal factors. Third, I employ a larger set of underlying variables to represent
speculative activities. My results show that the contribution of excess speculation in
this market increased to 28% after 2003 compared to 1% before 2003, which shows a
structural break in speculators’ contribution after 2003.
Moreover, one of the six strands of the literature considers variation in oil risk premia
IV
to address the existence of speculative activities in oil futures market, and a structural
change in oil futures markets in recent years. The literature, however, lacks a general
model of time-varying risk premia that incorporates all of the possible explanatory
variables of oil price ﬂuctuations.
The second chapter employs this approach, time-varying oil risk premia, to investigate
the role of speculative activity in this market, by introducing two novel features to the
literature. First, I consider the notion of time-varying risk premia along with other
explanations of oil price ﬂuctuations. Second, I provide evidence of excess speculation
based on these models. My results verify the variation of oil futures risk premia in
recent years.
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Chapter 1
Did Speculation Cause Greater
Volatility in Oil Prices?
1
1.1 Introduction
Starting in about 2003, a surge in both the volatility and price level of oil prices
has captured attention from academia and the public, and caused a public debate
about the determinants of the price of crude oil. Many researchers have tried to ﬁnd
if this surge can be explained by economic fundamentals, or if it is attributable to
speculators’ activity in the oil futures market. This has led to the existence of two
competing points of view about the major determinants of oil prices in the literature:
one relates it to changes in fundamentals, and the other attributes it to increased
speculators’ activity as a result of ﬁnancialization of oil markets.
This paper develops a new methodology to answer the following questions. First,
what is the major determinant of oil price ﬂuctuations, fundamentals or “excess spec-
ulation”? Second, how have the contribution of these two sources evolved since 2003?
The answers to these questions have implications for evaluating the two competing
views about the major determinant of oil price ﬂuctuations, and for policymakers
who have concerns about regulating this market.
My main ﬁnding is that excess speculation is the major driver of oil price ﬂuctuations
after 2003. This is a robust feature of the data, and it is not simply an eﬀect of the
higher volatility in oil price ﬂuctuations in this period. When considering monthly
frequency data for the whole period from 1986 to 2013, only 3.4 percent of oil price
ﬂuctuations can be explained by fundamentals, while 2 percent of oil price ﬂuctua-
tions are attributable to excess speculative activities. But after 2003, the contribution
of real activities to oil price ﬂuctuation increases to 9.3 percent, while the contribu-
tion of excess speculation increases to 27.5 percent. The remaining contribution is
attributable to idiosyncratic dynamics in oil prices. There has been a decline over
time in the relative importance of fundamental factors in accounting for oil price ﬂuc-
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tuations. In other words, the eﬀect of speculative activities in driving the oil price
is substantially increasing over time, especially during the period of high volatility in
oil price ﬂuctuations.
There are three main reasons why distinguishing between these two points of view,
and identifying the role of speculation in the oil market is diﬃcult. This paper at-
tempts to make progress on all three:
First, there were dramatic changes in the world economy which aﬀected the demand
and supply of oil at the same time that oil prices became more volatile. The devel-
opment of emerging economies such as China and India generated higher demand for
oil. There was also increased uncertainty on the supply side, such as below projec-
tion supplies by OPEC and non-OPEC countries, and political risk in oil producing
countries such as Russia.1 As a result, some researchers (Kilian and Murphy, 2014)
believe that the surge in prices and volatility in the oil market originates with this
dramatic change in fundamentals.
At the same time, there were dramatic changes in the ﬁnancialization of the oil
market, including technological advances in oil futures markets which gave ﬁnancial
investors such as hedge funds easy access to oil derivatives, resulting in an inﬂux of
investors to this market seeking high returns. As early as 2004, policy makers such
as Ben Bernanke were concerned, and warned about the appearance of this possi-
bly speculative component in oil prices. Michael W. Masters (2008), in testimony
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aﬀairs,
unequivocally attributes the new trend in oil volatility to the activity of a new type
of investors in this market, which he referred to as “index speculators”. He asserted
1See comments by former Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke:
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20041021/default.htm
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that the index speculators, unlike the traditional speculators, do not buy futures and
take delivery, but rather they roll their entire long position forward and need never
close these positions. As a result, their activity leads oil prices to be more volatile.
The occurrence of these two dramatic changes can each be considered as a potential
explanation for the new dynamics in oil prices, making it diﬃcult to identify the
empirical role of each separately.
Second, from an empirical perspective it is not always obvious how to measure spec-
ulation. The broad deﬁnition of speculation from Killian and Murphy (2011) is that
a speculator is “anyone buying crude oil not for current consumption, but for future
use” in the hope of proﬁt in the future. In this case, speculation is not necessarily
attributable to pure speculators, but also includes oil producers and oil companies
reducing current extraction (inventory under the ground) and keeping oil in inven-
tory above ground, in the pursuit of selling the oil at a higher price in the future.
Hence, there are at least two broad parties that behave speculatively according to
Killian and Murphy: pure speculators and oil companies. It is important to include
the speculation activity of all of these parties when gauging the extent of speculation,
but also to diﬀerentiate between the two.
Third, speculation (by pure speculators or oil companies) may or may not be closely
related to fundamentals. If there are expectations of rising oil prices, as in antici-
pation of a disruption of oil supplies or changes in oil demand, speculators increase
oil futures prices by buying oil futures contracts, which signal high spot prices in
the future. As a result, there is higher demand for oil inventory, both extracted and
unextracted. This, in turn, leads to an increase in current oil prices, a decrease in
current oil consumption, and an incentive for oil producers to increase their capacity
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of production in the future. In this manner, speculation provides liquidity to oil mar-
kets and helps the functions of price discovery and risk transfer between the future
and the present. This speculation is linked to changes in fundamentals and, hence,
as discussed by Fattouth et al. (2012), there may be no point in preventing this kind
of speculation. On the other hand, “excess speculation” may prevent the oil market
from functioning properly, generating changes in the dynamic of oil prices unrelated
to fundamentals. This speculation is only favorable from a private perspective, and is
not necessary for the market to react to fundamental shocks. Therefore, it is critical
to distinguish between these two types of speculative activity, but in practice making
this empirical distinction is diﬃcult.
Because of these issues, there is no clear deﬁnition on the role of speculation in oil
price movements. As discussed in Fattouth et al. (2012), “the academic literature
has focused on the problem of ﬁnding indirect evidence in support of the view that
ﬁnancial speculation has aﬀected oil prices” and “no one has been able to quantify
the problem of excessive speculation to date. Rather the public debate has tended
to conﬂate several recent developments in oil futures markets and in the spot market
for crude oil, taking the existence of excessive speculation as self-evident.”
This paper uses a new methodology to examine the contribution of fundamentals and
excess speculation to oil price ﬂuctuations, and analyzes if the contribution of funda-
mentals and excess speculation to oil price ﬂuctuations has evolved over the period
1986-2013. The basic idea in this paper is as follows. Assume that there is one index
which is representative of real activity in the economy (“fundamentals”), and there is
another index which captures all speculative activities by both pure speculators and
oil companies. The part of this total speculative activity which cannot be explained
by expectations of fundamentals is thus “excess speculation”, and is found as the
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residual from a regression of the speculative index on the expectation of the funda-
mentals index. Excess speculation is measured as the part of all speculative activity
that is orthogonal to fundamentals. Regressing oil price ﬂuctuations on the original
fundamental index and the residual excess speculative index allows me to calculate
how much of the variation in oil prices is caused by each.
In practice, I use a dynamic factor model (DFM) instead of the simple “indexes” men-
tioned above to capture fundamentals and overall speculative activity. I then ﬁnd the
part of overall speculative activity orthogonal to fundamentals, and label this “excess
speculation”. The dynamic factor model allows me to capture the common compo-
nent of ﬂuctuations in a large set of variables. The key output is a set of latent
dynamic factors that summarize the common movement behind a high-dimensional
vector of time-series data. The dynamic factor model does this without having to
make strong identifying assumptions or imposing a prior distribution on the param-
eters.
Fundamentals are therefore captured by a vector of latent factors common in a set of
up to 24 real variables, such as industrial production and housing starts. I ﬁnd the
common factors of overall speculative activity from a set of up to 11 variables related
to speculative activity, such as a proxy for speculators’ risk-aversion. The excess
speculation common factor can then be found by regressing the overall speculative
factors on the fundamental factors and taking the residuals, calling these the excess
speculation factors.
For my method, deciding what variables to include in the dynamic factor model
(DFM) is crucial. Variables which can gauge the extent of uncertainty in the oil
market provide me with the pool of potential explanatory variables for oil price ﬂuc-
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tuations. According to economic theory, similar economic forces drive both oil futures
risk premia and oil price ﬂuctuations.2 The futures risk premium reﬂects the com-
pensation for the uncertainty perceived in the oil market. Therefore, changes in
uncertainty provide information on changes in oil prices. I classify the variables mea-
suring uncertainty into two groups, fundamental and speculative variables.
One source of uncertainty is in the situation of the whole economy, and this is mea-
sured by fundamental variables. The second source of uncertainty is speciﬁc to the
oil market, and can be measured by uncertainty in the demand and supply of oil.
Variables measuring this second source of uncertainty, capture the overall activity of
both groups of speculators, oil producers and pure speculators.
My paper contributes to the literature in three dimensions: First and most impor-
tantly, I provide a clear empirical deﬁnition of excess speculation. The methodology
that I implement deﬁnes excess speculation factors as the component of all specula-
tive activity that is orthogonal to fundamental factors. Using these two orthogonal
factors, I can distinguish clearly between oil price movements driven by fundamentals
versus excess speculation.
Second, I make use of a much larger set of variables than the prior literature to capture
fundamental and speculative activities. This allows me to capture thoroughly the
commonality in each category of fundamental and speculative activities. Further, the
long time horizon enables me to consider two distinct sub-periods and, in particular,
enables me to analyze how the contribution of fundamentals and speculation to oil
price ﬂuctuations has evolved during the period of sharp increases in volatility after
2003.
2See Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Acharya et al. (2013).
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Third, I employ a set of recently developed econometric tools to analyze the question
of interest. Dynamic factor model captures the commonality of ﬂuctuations in either
fundamentals or speculative variables without making strong identifying assumptions
or imposing a prior distribution on the parameters. In comparison, the prior litera-
ture which uses structural VAR requires identifying assumptions which are somewhat
arbitrary and not generally compelling (Hamilton, 1994).
The results in this paper have important implications for policy makers who have
concerns about regulating the oil market such that they ensure this market functions
properly and the excess speculation activity no longer impacts this market. There
may be no point to impose restriction on the speculators’ activity in the oil market if
it merely reacts to changes in the real economy. The results in this paper, however,
lay out evidence of “excess speculation” in this market, which originates from pure
speculators’ activity especially after 2003, and it is not a function of fundamentals.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the existing literature on
the role of speculation and on commodity markets. Section 1.3 provides an underpin-
ning theory about how I classify the variables into two groups of fundamentals and
speculation. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical methodology of the paper in detail.
Section 1.5 mentions the data sources. Section 1.6 lays out the results, and ﬁnally,
Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Speculation, Excess Speculation and Findings on Spec-
ulation in Oil Market
Investigating the role of speculation is diﬃcult. There are at least two broad par-
ties of investors in the oil market who behave speculatively: pure speculators and oil
companies. These two parties are not isolated from each other and the behavior of
one party of speculators can aﬀect the behavior of the other group while both groups
are trying to maximize proﬁts. Deﬁning the extent of speculation requires ﬁrst quan-
tifying the speculation by all of these parties.
Moreover, speculation can be classiﬁed as desirable speculation or excessive specu-
lation. Desirable speculation provides liquidity to the commodity market and helps
price discovery and risk transfer, while excess speculation impacts the dynamics of
commodity prices adversely. For instance, it might increase the price volatility, and,
as a result of the increased uncertainty about energy costs, companies might make
less capital investments leading to slack in the economy. Therefore, it is necessary to
distinguish between desirable speculation and excessive speculation.
Fattouh et al. (2012) identify six strands in the literature which investigate the role
of speculation along with the critiques about why the speculation identiﬁed is not
necessarily compelling. In this section, I ﬁrst discuss the six strands and their cri-
tiques from Fattouh et al. (2012). Then, I will oﬀer my own critiques of the existing
literature.
First strand. The ﬁrst strand addresses the increased comovement among the spot
price of oil, oil futures prices, non-energy commodity prices, foreign exchange, and
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stock prices, or the higher correlation among their returns, as a result of ﬁnancializa-
tion of oil futures markets after 2003. It then argues that the new dynamics in oil
prices were caused by the activity of new ﬁnancial investors in this market (See e.g.
Tang and Xiong 2010).
The ﬁrst critique is that, according to economic theories, changes in global funda-
mentals will be reﬂected in both spot and futures prices, leading to a comovement
between them. Thus examining the comovement between spot and futures prices to
identify ﬁnancialization might be invalid. The second critique is the surge in the price
of non-exchange traded commodities after 2003, making it hard to consider the ﬁnan-
cialization in the commodity market as a potential explanation for this new trend in
prices.
Second strand. Another strand investigates if the increased ﬂows to oil index funds
predict changes in oil prices, which may be interpreted as the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial
investors on price dynamics in this market (Singleton 2012).
The ﬁrst critique on this strand is that including precise data on individual traders’
positions (such as hedge funds’ positions) rather than aggregated CFTC data on all
investors’ positions, leads to diﬀerent conclusions in precedence of predictability. For
instance, Bu¨yu¨ksahin and Harris (2011) ﬁnd futures price changes precede changes
in positions of hedge funds or other non-commercial investors, which then implies
speculators respond to the real economy. Which one, ﬂows to index funds or the
changes in oil futures prices, precedes the other one may lead to diﬀerent arguments
about the role of speculation.
The second critique is that even evidence that investors’ ﬂows precede price move-
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ment does not necessarily show the speculation. In the case that the activity of non-
commercial traders in the futures market is limited because of informational costs,
an increase in hedging demand increases the risk premium, which will be reﬂected
in oil futures returns and spot price ﬂuctuations, while higher hedging demand may
originate from the expectation of higher real economic activity.
Third strand. The third strand examines if there is a casual relation between fu-
tures prices and the spot price, and argues that higher futures prices cause increases
in the spot price of oil, as the oil futures price is used as a benchmark.
The critique is that the same economic forces drive both oil futures prices and spot
prices. It might be the case that expectations about oil demand and supply or real
economic activity increase oil futures prices, and then, according to economic theo-
ries, these expectations would be reﬂected in the oil spot price. Hence, ﬁnding a link
between futures prices and the spot price cannot be taken as evidence of speculation
Fourth strand. Another strand considers the evolution of oil inventories to address
the existence of speculation. In recent years, despite high oil inventories, oil prices
have increased. In other words, there is a positive relation between oil inventories
and oil prices after 2003, rather than a negative relation, which might be a sign of
speculation in this market.
The ﬁrst critique is that the positive relation between the oil futures spread (which
might be considered as a speculative component of the real oil price according to
Fattouh et al. (2012)) and the change in world oil inventories may imply speculation,
while this strand considers the positive relation between nominal oil prices and U.S.
inventories, which is misleading for investigating the role of speculators.
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Second, even ﬁnding a positive relationship between the oil futures spread and the
change in world oil inventories can indicate the role of speculation if one assumes that
the speculators’ activity exogenously increases oil futures prices, which in turn lead
to an increase in oil inventories. In the case that the speculators behave endogenously
in response to the real economy, the increase in oil inventories cannot be taken as
an evidence of speculation. For example, expectations about higher oil demand or
shortages in oil supply may encourage more buyers of oil futures contracts and higher
futures prices.
Fifth strand. A ﬁfth strand considers models in which the risk premium in the
commodity market (compensation on the risk related to a futures contract) evolves
over time, and takes it as evidence of speculative activities in oil futures market. This
strand also considers large changes in the term structure of oil futures and the shift
in the front end and the back end of the term structure of oil futures as indicators
of a structural change in oil futures markets in recent years. I discuss modeling the
time-varying risk premia in more details in chapter 2.
The critique is that although time-varying risk premia might be suggestive of the
inﬂuence of ﬁnancial investors on oil futures markets, there is no evidence of excess
speculation based on these models. It is also not obvious which of time-varying risk
premia or structural VAR has better explanatory power and predictability of oil price
ﬂuctuations.
Sixth strand. The last strand of the literature is one which uses structural vector
autoregression models of the oil market to examine speculation. Structural VARs
allow a disentangling of the diﬀerent shocks to oil price ﬂuctuations, including oil
supply and oil demand shocks as well as speculative shocks, and gauging the eﬀect of
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each shock separately on oil price ﬂuctuations.
Kilian and Murphy (2011) were the ﬁrst structural VAR in this literature and in-
cluded four variables: global oil production, a measure of global real activity, the
real price of crude oil, and the change in above-ground global crude oil inventories.
They reason that shocks to above-ground global oil inventories can be interpreted
as speculative shocks when the price elasticity of oil demand is diﬀerent from zero.
As Hamilton (2009b) discusses, if the price elasticity is not zero, then a change in oil
inventories must signal speculation. In this case, an increase in oil prices as a result of
speculators’ activity in the oil futures market leads to a reduction in oil consumption
and in turn, a reﬂection in oil inventories. Kilian and Murphy (2011) show that the
short-run price elasticity of oil demand is about -0.25. Thus, they argue any increase
in oil prices as a result of speculators’ activity in the oil futures market is reﬂected
in involuntary accumulation of oil inventories. They ﬁnd changes in oil prices after
2003 can be well explained by positive shocks to world oil demand through global real
activity. In contrast, the surge in oil prices is not explained by speculative demand
for inventories. Their results show speculation by oil producers or other negative oil
supply shocks had little impact on the real price of oil.
In two other studies, Juvenal and Petrella (2011) and Lombardi and Van Robays
(2011) argue that the Kilian and Murphy model does not capture “ﬁnancial specu-
lation”. Hence, in a structural VAR model, they introduce other speculative shocks
besides above-ground global oil inventories shock in Kilian and Murphy (2011). Ju-
venal and Petrella (2011) consider under-ground oil inventory shocks as speculative
supply shocks by oil producers, and Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) deﬁne spec-
ulative shocks as a shock that leads to a contemporaneous increase in both the oil
futures spread and the oil futures price.
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As discussed by Fattouh et al. (2012), the speculative supply shock in Juvenal and
Petrella (2011) can be considered the same as the ﬂow supply shock in Kilian and
Murphy (2011) since it impacts the oil supply. Moreover, standard models of storage
assert that a speculative demand shock results in a negative oil futures spread, while
Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) consider the positive oil futures spread as a sign of
speculative activity.
Another paper that investigates the role of speculation is Knittle et al. (2013). Their
work can be classiﬁed in the fourth strand (which involves inventories) discussed
above, where they apply a new method for deﬁning the contribution of speculation.
They express the oil price as a function of oil supply and demand as well as oil in-
ventories. Then, they use a variance decomposition to identify that part of oil price
ﬂuctuations due to inventory changes, holding supply and demand contributions con-
stant. They attribute this fraction of oil price ﬂuctuations to speculation over the
1999-2012 period and conclude that it is trivial. The results are questionable. First,
the eﬀect of the change in oil demand and supply only reﬂects in the shift in oil de-
mand and supply while other parameters such as elasticities of oil supply and demand
are assumed to be constant implying no structural break in the oil market. Second,
they argue that the shift in demand for storage is due solely to speculative activity,
ruling out a role of fundamentals for the shift.
1.2.2 Critiques of the Existing Literature
Regardless, the advantage of the structural VAR is that it incorporates a role for
changes in economic fundamentals. In comparison, as discussed above, by ignoring
real activity, all of the evidence on speculation provided in the other ﬁve strands
discussed by Fattouh et al. (2012) might be explained by changes in real economic
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activity.
Fattouh et al.(2012) assert that the structural VAR in Killian and Murphy (2011)
“provides the most decisive and most formal evidence on the question of speculation
to date.” In that paper, the interpretation of oil inventory shocks as speculative shocks
is based on the assumption of unlimited arbitrage between the oil futures market and
the oil spot market.3
There are several caveats regarding Killian and Murphy (2011, 2014) interpretation,
as follows. First, the assumption of unlimited arbitrage itself is questionable. There is
a limited capacity for holding oil above ground, and the response of oil inventories to
contemporaneous changes in the real economy and speculation in oil futures market
is constrained. In fact, Killian and Murphy (2011, 2014) implicitly assume that the
elasticity of storage space to inventory demand is positive, but this seems unlikely
to hold in the short run. As such, by ordering oil inventories last in a SVAR, the
structural shock to oil inventories, which they identify as the speculative component,
can be made arbitrarily small. This identiﬁcation assumption invalidates the argu-
ment that considering other speculative variables such as “the oil futures spread are
redundant” in their model.
Second, they do not allow for time-varying volatility in structural inventories shocks
or a structural break in volatility, which might invalidate the results. They imply
that “percentage change in inventories does not appear to be covariance stationary,
whereas the change in inventories does”. As a result, they include the change in in-
ventories in the SVAR model to resolve this problem, which is not compelling. Models
of time-varying risk premia suggest there is a structural break in the oil market and
3They also specify the real oil price in log levels, assuming its stationary while I believe that this
is an invalid assumption. The question of oil prices’ stationarity is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the interaction of oil producers and speculators is not constant over time. In the case
that we allow for time-variation in risk premia, the results in their paper are no longer
reliable.
Third, if speculators’ activity increases the expected default frequencies of oil compa-
nies, oil inventories cannot be chosen as a proper proxy for capturing the speculation
in oil markets. As Acharya et al. (2013) demonstrate, the reaction of oil companies
to an increase in expected default frequency would be a reduction in oil inventories.
In my paper, I address the caveats mentioned above. First, I incorporate other vari-
ables rather than oil inventories to capture speculative activities. Second, I employ
variables which impact time-varying risk premia as potential explanatory variables of
oil price ﬂuctuations. Both spot prices and futures prices respond to the same eco-
nomic forces according to economic theory, hence variables which gauge risk premia
can be employed as the explanatory variables of oil price ﬂuctuations. The advantage
is that by including these variables, I allow for evolution of the risk premia and as a
result, the evolution of oil price dynamics over time, rather than assuming the con-
stant dynamics which might lead to invalid results. Third, I construct an empirical
model which captures the interaction between oil producers and speculators.
Moreover, I incorporate two groups of orthogonal factors which enables me to disen-
tangle the diﬀerent shocks to oil prices, which is essential for an accurate answer to
this question. I also employ a common factor method which allows me to consider
the contribution of the diﬀerent sources to oil price ﬂuctuations in a ﬂexible manner,
rather than making some arbitrary identiﬁcation assumptions in a SVAR, which are
not necessarily consistent with economic theories.
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Thus, I construct an empirical model for investigating oil price ﬂuctuations based on
time-varying risk premia which allow the time variation in interaction between oil
producers and speculators. The methodology employed also allows me to address the
existence of excess speculation if there is any.
1.3 The Theoretical Underpinning for the Vari-
ables in the Empirical Methodology
Deciding what variables to include in the dynamic factor model (DFM) as fundamen-
tal and speculative variables is crucial. The business cycle variables can be considered
as fundamental variables. The speculative variables can be considered as variables
that distort oil futures risk premia from the risk-adjustment of equity holders and
capture the impact and interaction of two groups of speculators (pure speculators
and oil producers) on oil futures risk premia. Below I explain the logic behind this.
Potential explanatory variables to explain oil price ﬂuctuations, in this paper, are
chosen based on the model of time-varying risk premia in Acharya, Lochstoer and
Ramadorai (2013). The variables employed in their paper to measure the extent of
uncertainty and, as a result, for measuring the oil futures risk premium, provide me
with a means for determining the sources of oil price ﬂuctuations.
It is important to emphasize that according to economic theory, any changes in oil
futures risk premia must be reﬂected in ﬂuctuation in oil spot prices by construction.
In fact, the same economic forces drive both spot prices and futures prices. Figure 1.1
shows the comovement between oil spot price ﬂuctuations and oil futures risk premia.
Thus, variables which gauge oil futures risk premia can be employed for explaining
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ﬂuctuation in oil spot prices.
Figure 1.1: Comovement Between Oil Price Fluctuations and Oil Futures Returns
The model in Acharya et al. (2013) provides the theoretical underpinning for the
variables included and the empirical strategy introduced in this paper, and can also
be helpful in understanding the empirical methodology section. Thus, I brieﬂy ex-
plain some aspects of this model.
Acharya et al. (2013) introduce a two-period general equilibrium model of commodity
spot and futures price determination. Comparative statics for commodity spot and
futures prices with regard to the variables are then derived from the reduced form of
the model. The three types of agents in the model are as follows.
Consumers who are demanders of spot commodity.
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Commodity producers are price takers and have risk-averse managers. Managers
face a tradeoﬀ between proﬁt and earnings variance in the next period. This as-
sumption induces the risk-averse manager to optimally manage the inventory and
to optimally hedge with commodity futures. When hedging, producers hold more
inventory and in turn, they decrease the risk related to next period’s earning. If
the futures price is lower than the expected future prices, the producer can increase
expected proﬁts by entering a long speculative futures position. An increase in the
manager’s risk aversion decreases this speculative futures position.
Speculators take the long positions, rather than the short positions taken by pro-
ducers, and the interaction of these two groups determines the futures price. On the
other hand, speculators are risk-neutral, and the speculators face capital constraints
due to leverage costs or Value-at-Risk (VaR) limitations.
In the stochastic general equilibrium (SGE) framework, in which each agent max-
imises its objective function subject to a constraint it faces and then a general equi-
librium is considered, they derive the futures risk premium (the compensation for the
uncertainty in the oil market). In the case that the speculators do not face the capi-
tal constraint, the futures risk premium would be equal to the excess market return.
Incorporating the capital constraint in the model, the futures risk premium in this
market is no longer equal to excess market return (equity risk premium), which can
be gauged by business cycle variables. Rather, the futures risk premium also depends
on the risk-aversion of speculators and producers. Speciﬁcally, the futures risk pre-
mium and the expected percentage point change in the spot price are increasing in
producers’ risk-aversion (producers’ fundamental hedging demand) and speculators’
risk-aversion (the degree of speculators’ capital constraints).
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The intuition for the eﬀect of producers’ risk-aversion and speculators’ risk-aversion
on the futures risk premium and oil price ﬂuctuations is as follows. An increase in
producers’ risk-aversion causes the producers to be more cautious about holding un-
hedged inventory. As a result, they increase the number of short futures positions
inducing a higher variance-adjusted demand in the futures market. The producers
also decrease oil inventory leading the current spot prices to decrease and future spot
price to increase. Overall, these two strategies result in the higher futures risk pre-
mium and expectations for higher spot price ﬂuctuations. Moreover, an increase in
risk-aversion of speculators means that there should be more compensation for the
risk they are tolerating. The producers respond to this by decreasing the number
of short futures positions (lower short hedger positions), which leads to having more
unhedged inventory and being at more risk in the next period. The producers in turn
reduce their inventory which depresses the current spot price. The overall eﬀect is
higher futures risk premium and the higher expected spot price ﬂuctuations.
In addition, the extent to which fundamental hedging demand impacts the futures
risk premium depends on the variance of the commodity future returns as well as
speculator risk tolerance. In particular, the impact of fundamental hedging demand
on the futures risk premium is higher when the variance of the commodity futures
returns is high (the eﬀect can be captured by an interaction term between fundamen-
tal hedging demand and the variance of the commodity futures returns, as shown in
the empirical section). Also, a change in fundamental hedging demand has a larger
eﬀect on the futures risk premium if speculator risk tolerance is low, which requires
greater compensation reﬂected in the higher futures risk premium (the eﬀect can be
captured by an interaction term between fundamental hedging demand and specula-
tor risk tolerance, as shown in the empirical section). Indeed, the channel that the
speculators’ risk-aversion impacts futures and spot commodity prices is through the
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hedging demand of producers.
Thus, the variables included in their paper gauge time-varying oil futures risk premia.
The futures risk premia in the oil market reﬂects the compensation for two sources
of uncertainty in the oil futures market. Therefore, I require variables which gauge
these two sources.
The ﬁrst source of variation in risk premia in the oil market is associated with the
uncertainty in the whole economy and can be gauged by business cycle variables.
This is represented by the excess market return. Thus, business cycle variables can
be employed as a forecaster of excess market returns, which are related to the condi-
tional covariance of futures returns with equity holders’ pricing kernel. For instance,
Acharya et al. (2013) use business cycle variables such as the default spread (the
diﬀerence between the Baa and Aaa rated corporate bond yields, which captures ag-
gregate default risk in the whole economy) as a forecaster of excess returns on stocks
and bonds4 , and the risk-free rate (such as 3M T-bill rate) as a robust, out-of-sample
predictor of equity market excess returns.5
The second source of variation in risk premia in the oil market (futures excess return)
represents the compensation to oil producers and speculators as the investors in this
market for tolerating the idiosyncratic risk speciﬁc to the oil market. The futures
excess returns can be related to hedging demand (see e.g. De Roon, Nijman, and
Veld, 2000). Futures excess returns can also be gauged by the interaction of hedgers
and arbitrageurs (see e.g. Hirshleifer, 1988, 1990 and Acharya et al., 2013).
4As shown by Fama and French (1989)
5As shown by Ang and Bekaert (2007)
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1.4 Empirical Methodology
The empirical methodology that I employ requires identiﬁcation of two diﬀerent
sources of oil price ﬂuctuations, and accounts for the dynamic relationship between
the set of fundamentals and speculation variables. In order to understand my ap-
proach, I ﬁrst describe the methodology brieﬂy, and then discuss dynamic factor
models following Stock and Watson (2010). Finally I describe the exact nature of my
empirical methodology.
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Empirical Methodology
I construct a model that contains two orthogonal groups of factors: (1) fundamental
factors common to real variables (Ffund), and (2) excess speculation factors common
only to speculative variables (Fexspec). Letting ΔOilt denote the growth rate of the
oil price, the model can be written as:
ΔOilt = βfFfund,t + βsFexspec,t + et. (1.1)
The coeﬃcients βf and βs quantify the extent to which oil price ﬂuctuations move
with the fundamental factors and the excess speculation factors.
I use a variance decomposition to assess the relative contributions of fundamental and
speculative variables to oil price ﬂuctuations. With orthogonal factors, the variance
of oil price ﬂuctuations can be written as follows:
var(ΔOilt) = β
2
fvar(Ffund,t) + β
2
svar(Fexspec,t) + var(et). (1.2)
Then, the fraction of volatility in oil price ﬂuctuations due to changes in fundamentals
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is
β2fvar(Ffund,t)
var(ΔOilt)
. (1.3)
and the fraction of volatility in oil price ﬂuctuations purely due to excess speculative
activities in the economy is
β2svar(Fexspec,t)
var(ΔOilt)
. (1.4)
The main empirical issue I have is that there is no single index of “fundamentals”,
Ffund, or of speculative activity, Fexspec. Therefore, my methodology uses dynamic
factor models to ﬁnd a vector Ffund of the common factors driving ﬂuctuations in
real activity, as captured by a set of variables described in section 1.4.3. Similarly, I
use dynamic factor models to ﬁnd a vector Fexspec that are the common factors of a
set of variables associated with speculative activity in the rest of the economy.
1.4.2 Common Factor
Dynamic factor models (DFMs) are time-series extension of factor models initially
developed for cross-sectional data. The key ﬁnding is that the common movement
behind a high-dimensional vector of macroeconomic data can be captured and summa-
rized by a few unobservable (latent) dynamic factors without making strong identify-
ing assumptions or imposing a prior distribution on parameters to separately identify
the eﬀects of diﬀerent shocks. This common trend can explain a large fraction of ﬂuc-
tuations (variance) of each series and is modeled as a vector autoregression (VAR).
Besides the common trend, the process of each series also includes a mean-zero id-
iosyncratic trend which represents the unique feature of that series. Formally, the
dynamic factor model can be speciﬁed as
Xt = λ(L)ft + et (1.5)
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ft = ψ(L)ft−1 + ηt (1.6)
where Xt is a (N×1) vector of observable variables (Xt is, for example, a vector of ei-
ther fundamental or speculative variables), there are q dynamic factors (ft) and λ(L)
shows the dynamic factor loading for each series. By assumption, all the processes
in (1.5) and (1.6) are stationary, the idiosyncratic disturbances (et) are uncorrelated
with the factor innovations (ηt) at all leads and lags, and the idiosyncratic distur-
bances are mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags.
Equivalently, the dynamic factor model can be rewritten as a linear state space model:
Xt = ΛFt + et (1.7)
Φ(L)Ft = Gηt (1.8)
which is referred to the “static form” of the DFM , because the factors in this repre-
sentation appear only contemporaneously, although the static factors include current
and past values of the dynamic factors. Ft = (f
′
t , f
′
t−1, ..., f
′
t−p)
′ is an (r × 1) vector
of r static factors, Λ = (λ0, λ1, ..., λp) where λi is the (N × q) matrix of coeﬃcients
on the ith lag in λ(L), Φ(L) is the matrix of 1
′
s , 0
′
s and the elements of ψ(L), and
G is a matrix of 1
′
s and 0
′
chosen in a way that the dynamic and static forms of the
DFM are equivalent.
There are three ways to specify the time-series extension of DFMs, including: (1)
the Kalman ﬁlter as a parametric model for estimating the factors between low-
dimensional vector of observations; (2) principal components, which is a nonparamet-
ric model, for estimating the factors between high-dimensional vector of observations
and; (3) hybrid principal components and state space methods.
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I cannot use the Kalman ﬁlter since I am employing a large set of variables. I also
cannot employ the principal components models since there is no dynamic time-series
process considered in this method. I employ the third method which considers a time-
series process for the factors and solves the dimensionality problem related to ﬁrst
model. Thus, I estimate the factors using the third method, which is a two-step
procedure. First, I estimate the nonparametric factors using the cross-sectional av-
eraging of a principal components method, and second, I estimate the parameters of
the state space model as in the ﬁrst method.
Principal components estimation. In this method, the factors are estimated by
cross-sectional averaging of Xt. The idea is that by the weak law of large numbers,
the weighted averages of the idiosyncratic disturbances converge to zero and only
linear combinations of the factors remain. The principal components estimator is
the weighted average estimator of Xt, where the weight is deﬁned as the matrix of
scaled eigenvectors of the sample variance matrix of Xt, Σˆx, related to its r largest
eigenvalues. The principal components estimator ﬁnds the weight matrix which is the
solution to the following minimization problem:
minF1,...,FT ,ΛVr(Λ, F ) =
1
NT
T∑
i=1
(Xt − ΛFt)′(Xt − ΛFt) (1.9)
subject to the normalization N−1Λ
′
Λ.
The key result is that the principal components estimator of the space spanned by
the estimated factors in this method is consistent, even when allowing for weak serial
and cross-correlation in the idiosyncratic disturbances, and in addition, if the number
of observations is suﬃciently large, then the estimated factors can be used as data in
subsequent regressions.
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State space model with static factors. Given the static factors Fˆt , estimated
by the principal component model, the parameters of the state space model in the
“static form” of the DFM, (1.7)-(1.8), are estimated by a regression of Xt on Fˆt, and
the residuals from this regression are used to estimate the univariate autoregressive
dynamic process of idiosyncratic errors. The VAR coeﬃcients ψ(L) are estimated by
a regression of Fˆt onto its lags, and the variance of Gηt is estimated by the residuals
from this VAR.
Determining the number of static factors (r). As mentioned above, the static
factors summarize the information contained in the vector of observable variables Xt.
Bai and Ng (2002) propose an estimator for the number of static factors (r) based on
information criteria, which trades oﬀ the beneﬁt of including an additional factor in
increasing the explained variation and the cost of increased sampling variability for
estimating another factor. They estimate the number of static factors by minimizing:
IC(r) = lnV (Λˆ, Fˆ ) + rg(N, T ) (1.10)
where the ﬁrst term is the least squares objective function (Eq.1.9) evaluated at the
principal components estimators (Λˆ, Fˆ ) , and rg(N, T ) is a penalty factor. According
to Bai and Ng (2002), g(N, T ) can be considered as:
g(N, T ) = (N + T )ln(min(N, T ))/(NT ) (1.11)
which does well in simulations.
Determining the number of dynamic factors (q). The dynamic factors (q) de-
termine the order of autoregressive process for static factors (order of Φ(L) in Eq.1.8).
Amenguel and Watson (2007) propose an estimate of the number of dynamic factors
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which is based on the observation that the residuals in a regression of Xt on past
values of ft have a factor structure with rank q. Thus, they apply Bai-Ng (2002)
information criterion to the sample variance matrix of these residuals to obtain a
consistent estimate of the number of dynamic factors.
1.4.3 Speciﬁcation of Empirical Methodology, Identiﬁcation,
and Estimation
This section lays out the exact empirical methodology for investigating the contribu-
tion of fundamentals and speculation to oil price ﬂuctuations. I consider the interac-
tion between oil price ﬂuctuations and a wide range of fundamentals which measure
economic activity. Moreover, I consider the interactions among those parts of specu-
lative variables speciﬁc to speculators’ activity. The empirical methodology which I
employ in deriving the common factors is a slightly diﬀerent version of the method-
ology applied by Gilchrist et al. (2009). I consider four speciﬁcations in this section.
First, I explain the baseline speciﬁcation.
Let Xt, t = 1, 2, ..., T , denote a (n×1) vector of observations on each variable at time
t. The vector of observations (Xt) can be partitioned as Xt = [X
′
fund,t, X
′
spec,t]
′
, where
Xfund,t is the (nf×1) vector whose elements correspond to measures of fundamentals,
and Xspec,t is the (ns×1) vector whose elements correspond to measures of speculative
activity. The information in each partition of the vector of observable variables Xt,
can be summarized by a set of latent factors. The (rf × 1) vector of “fundamental”
factors, Ffund,t, spans all the information contained in the observed vector Xfund,t,
with rf < nf . The second group of factors (excess speculation factors), denoted by
the (rs × 1) vector Fexspec,t, spans the part of information contained in the observed
vector Xspec,t which is speciﬁcally related to speculative activities, with rs < ns.
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A six-step estimation procedure is used to estimate and identify the fundamental and
excess speculation factors, which enables me to investigate the contribution of each
partition of observable variables (fundamental and speculative variables) to oil price
ﬂuctuations.
First: The (T × rf ) matrix of factors Ffund is estimated as the ﬁrst rf principle com-
ponents of the (T × nf ) data matrix Xfund, while the number of latent static factors
(rf ) is chosen according to the Bai and Ng (2002) method. These fundamental factors
(Ffund) capture the common trend between the ﬁrst partition of observable variables
(fundamentals variables) excluding the idiosyncratic trend which is speciﬁc to each
of these variables. Hence, these fundamental factors summarize the real activity in
the economy.
Second: The number of dynamic factors (qf ) for the fundamental factors (Ffund) is
estimated using Amenguel and Watson’s (2007) procedure. The dynamic process of
the fundamental factors then can be described by the following autoregressive process:
[Ffund,t] = Φ(L)[Ffund,t−1] + [εf,t] (1.12)
Where Φ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L of ﬁnite order qf , with
qf denoting the number of dynamic fundamental factors, and εf is the (rf × 1) vec-
tor of reduced-form VAR disturbances with a covariance matrix Σ = E[εftε
′
ft]. The
VAR(qf ) model is estimated by OLS using the estimated static factors. Then, I ﬁnd
the estimated rf factors in Ffund at time t+ 1, which represent the expectation of rf
fundamental factors (Ffund) at time t+ 1 as of time t.
Third: Each column of the (T × ns) data matrix Xspec corresponding to the vector
of variables in Xspec,t, (the variables which summarize the speculative activities in the
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economy) is regressed on the expectation of rf fundamental factors Ffund at time t+1
as of time t, Et(Ffund,t+1), estimated in the second step in Eq.1.12, with Eˆ denoting
the corresponding (T×ns) matrix of OLS residuals. The residuals (Eˆ) are orthogonal
to the fundamental common factors, and capture the variation in speculative vari-
ables which does not originate from real economic activity. The reason I consider the
fundamental factors at time t + 1 rather than time t, is that eﬃcient markets imply
that the speculators’ activities are formed based on the expectation of real activity
in the next period. Thus the expectation of change in the real activity variables in
the next period aﬀects the ﬂuctuation of speculative variables at time t.
Fourth: The (T × rs) matrix of factors Fexspec is estimated as the ﬁrst rs principle
components of the data matrix Eˆ from the second step, and the number of latent
static factors (rs) is chosen according to the Bai and Ng (2002) method. Since the
residuals from the third step are orthogonal to fundamental factors (Ffund), the ex-
cess speculation factors (Fexspec) estimated in this step are orthogonal to Ffund by
construction and represent the common factor of speculators’ activities which is not
related to real economic activity.
Fifth: Assuming the relationship between oil price ﬂuctuations and the common
factors is linear, oil price ﬂuctuations are regressed on the estimated orthogonal factors
of fundamental and excess speculation.
ΔOilt = βfFfund,t + βsFexspec,t + et. (1.13)
Sixth: I decompose the variance of oil price ﬂuctuations using the common factors
estimated and ﬁnd the relative contribution of each of these factors to oil price ﬂuc-
tuations.
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var(ΔOilt) = β
2
fvar(Ffund,t) + β
2
svar(Fexspec,t) + var(et). (1.14)
Variables Entering Dynamic Factor Model
The variables included in Xfund,t are macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables which
can be classiﬁed into four broad categories. These are economic activity indicators,
inﬂation indicators, risk-free interest rates, and ﬁnancial indicators. See Appendix A
for data sources.
Included as economic activity variables are: (1) the diﬀerence of the civilian unemploy-
ment rate; (2) the log-diﬀerence of nonfarm payroll employment; (3) the log-diﬀerence
of industrial production index; (4) the diﬀerence in capacity utilization index; (5) the
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) diﬀusion index of activity in the manufac-
turing sector; (6) the log-diﬀerence of real personal consumption expenditures (retail
control category); (7) the log-diﬀerence of housing starts; (8) and the leading eco-
nomic indicator index.6
For variables capturing price dynamics, I consider two inﬂation indicators: (1) the
log-diﬀerence of the core CPI; (2) the log- diﬀerence of the core PPI.
To capture risk-free interest rates I use: seven interest rates which include the entire
term structure of interest rates. In particular, the eﬀective federal funds rate, and
6The leading index predicts the six-month growth rate of the coincident index. In addition to the
coincident index, the models include other variables that lead the economy: housing permits (1 to
4 units), initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Man-
agement (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury
bond and the 3-month Treasury bill.
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constant maturity Treasury yields at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, and
10 years. To obtain the approximate stationarity, I convert the nominal yields into
real terms.7
Finally, to capture ﬁnancial market activity I use: (1) the total value-weighted excess
market return; (2) the implied volatility on the S&P500 index options (V IX) to cap-
ture uncertainty in the equity market; (3) the diﬀerence between Moody’s Baa and
Aaa rated corporate bond yields to capture aggregate default risk in the economy and
expected excess returns on stocks and bonds; (4) the implied volatilities on Eurodol-
lar interest rate, a measure of uncertainty of movement in short-term interest rates;
(5) the implied volatilities on 10-year Treasury note futures, a measure of uncertainty
of movements in long-term interest rates; (6) the log-diﬀerence of the trade-weighted
exchange value of the dollar against major currencies; and (7) the diﬀerence between
the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year Treasury note, a measure of liquidity.
How do I measure speculative activity? As I explained in section 1.3, both spot
prices and futures prices react to the same economic forces as economic theory pre-
dicts. Thus, the futures risk premium, which is modeled in terms of the sum of the
excess market return and the futures excess return, can be employed for explaining the
ﬂuctuation in oil spot prices. In this case, the above fundamental variables (Xfund)
7Following Gilchrist et al. (2009), I employ both the realized inﬂation and survey measures of
inﬂation expectations to convert the nominal yields to real terms. The realized inﬂation is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the log of the core CPI price index and its value 12 months earlier. The
inﬂation expectation, collected by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF ), is at a quarterly
frequency and includes the 1-year and 10-years ahead expected CPI inﬂation. Thus, I obtain
the monthly estimates of inﬂation expectations from a linear interpolation of quarterly inﬂation
expectations. Moreover, the expected inﬂation for 2 years, 3 years and 5 years is calculated by using
the weighted average of 1-year ahead and 10-year ahead expected inﬂation. Simply, for calculating
the 3-year expected inﬂation, I use the weights of 0.7 and 0.3 respectively on 1-year ahead and
10-year ahead expected inﬂation. Then, the real federal funds rate is measured as the diﬀerence
between the nominal rate and realized inﬂation. The real 6-month Treasury yield is measured as
the diﬀerence between the nominal yield and the equally weighted average of the realized inﬂation
and the one-year ahead expected inﬂation. Remaining real Treasury yields, are obtained by the
diﬀerence between the nominal yields and the appropriate expected inﬂation rate discussed above.
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summarizing the real economy capture both excess market returns and some portion
of futures excess returns which respond to fundamentals. The remaining part of the
futures excess return is assumed to be driven by speculative activity.
The vector of Xspec contains 11 variables which reﬂect the information about spec-
ulators’ activity in the economy. They are: (1) the variation in the aggregate level
of fundamental hedging demand for oil, which can be proxied for by aggregate com-
modity producer default risk (EDF ); (2) the realized variance of oil futures returns
(RV ) as a variable for time variation in the quantity of risk in the commodity mar-
ket; (3) the implied crude oil volatility index (OVX), a measure of quantity of risk in
the commodity market; (4) the interaction between expected default frequency of oil
companies and the variance of oil futures returns (EDF×RV ); (5) the interaction be-
tween expected default frequency of oil companies and the implied crude oil volatility
index (EDF ×OVX); (6) the variation in the aggregate level of fundamental hedging
demand, which can be proxied for by the Zmijewski-score (Zm score) by using the
ﬁrm-level balance-sheet variables; (7) the interaction between the Zmijewski-score
of oil companies and the variance of oil futures returns (Zm score × RV ); (8) the
interaction between the Zmijewski-score of oil companies and the implied crude oil
volatility index (Zm score×OVX); (9) the risk tolerance of speculators, which can
be proxied for by growth in intermediaries’ assets relative to household asset growth
as a measure of speculators’ ease of access to capital in aggregate (γ−1s ); (10) the in-
teraction between expected default frequency of oil companies and the risk tolerance
of speculators (EDF × γ−1s ); (11) the interaction between the Zmijewski-score of oil
companies and the risk tolerance of speculators (Zm score× γ−1s ).
Thus in the above baseline speciﬁcation, the vector Xfund contains 24 macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial time-series. The 11 elements of vector Xspec correspond to the variables
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that can summarize the speculative activities in the economy. Recalling my proce-
dure, I ﬁrst ﬁnd the common factors of Xfund, and then extract the part of Xspec that
is orthogonal to Xfund. So it is only speculative activity unrelated to fundamentals
that I call “excess speculation”.
In addition to the baseline speciﬁcation, for the robustness check of the results, I
consider two other speciﬁcations, including,
Speciﬁcation 1: I incorporate global economic activity by including two proxies for
global economic activity in the vector Xfund,t. Following Juvenal and Petrella (2011),
the ﬁrst proxy which I consider is world industrial production and the second proxy
is dry cargo bulk freight rates as proposed by Kilian (2009).
Speciﬁcation 2: I augment Speciﬁcation 1 with world oil supply. In fact, I incorpo-
rate two proxies for global economic activity as well as world oil supply in the vector
Xfund,t.
1.5 Data
The data are from diﬀerent sources mentioned in Appendix A, including Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis, Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF ), the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP )-Compustat database and the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP ) (in Warton Research Data Services (WRDS)), Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE), U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
the U.S. Flow of Funds data, Economagic website, and Lutz Kilian’s website 8. It
8http://www.economagic.com
http://www-personal.umich.edu/ lkilian/paperlinks.html
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includes data over the period 1986-2013 for most of the series, while the data for some
series is available only for a subset of the period. In addition, I construct proxies for
some of the variables described in Appendix B. The data and proxies for variables
have been tested for stationarity and those which are integrated of order one (I(1))
have been transformed to diﬀerence out unit roots and trends. Then, as is standard
in using principal component models, the data have been standardized to have mean
zero and unit standard deviation.
1.6 Empirical Results
The empirical results are shown in Table 1.1-1.5. It includes the results for diﬀerent
speciﬁcation discussed in section 1.4.3 and for diﬀerent sample periods based on the
data availability. As mentioned in the Introduction, the variance of the oil price has
increased substantially after 2003. To study how oil price ﬂuctuations have evolved
over time in response to changes in fundamental and speculative activities, I also
consider two distinct periods, the low volatility period in the oil price (before 2003,
subsample 1) and the high volatility period in the oil price (after 2003, subsample 2).
This can then show a possible structural break in the contribution of fundamentals
and speculative activities to oil price ﬂuctuations.
Table 1.1 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 19 fundamental
variables available for the whole sample period 1986-2013. The contribution of fun-
damentals is about 3% for the whole period, 1.1% for the subsample 1, and 8.3%
for the subsample 2. The contribution of second lagged of excess speculation factors
to oil price ﬂuctuations is about 2% for the whole sample, 1.1% for the subsample
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1, and 27.5% for the subsample 2. The results show an increase in contribution of
fundamental factors and a surge in contribution of excess speculation factors to oil
price ﬂuctuations after 2003.
Table 1.2 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations in Speciﬁcation 1, augmenting two proxies of global
economic activity to fundamental variables in Baseline speciﬁcation. The sample pe-
riod changes to 1994-2013 due to availability of data on world industrial production.
The contribution of fundamentals is about 12.9% for the whole period, 3.6% for the
subsample 1, and 9.8% for the subsample 2. The contribution of second lagged of
excess speculation factors to oil price ﬂuctuations is about 5.1% for the whole sam-
ple, 4.5% for the subsample 1, and 16.2% for the subsample 2. The results show an
increase in contribution of fundamental factors and excess speculation factors to oil
price ﬂuctuations after 2003.
Table 1.3 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations in Speciﬁcation 2, augmenting world oil supply to
fundamental variables in Speciﬁcation 1. The contribution of fundamentals is about
12.6% for the whole period, 2.1% for the subsample 1 (1994-2003), and 11.2% for the
subsample 2 (2004-2013). The contribution of second lagged of excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations is about 5.1% for the whole sample, 4.3% for the
subsample 1, and 18.1% for the subsample 2. The results show an increase in contri-
bution of fundamental factors and excess speculation factors to oil price ﬂuctuations
after 2003.
Table 1.4 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 22 fundamental
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variables. The sample starts from 2004:10 since the data on three of the fundamental
variables including Real personal consumption expenditures, V IX, and a measure of
liquidity (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the
5-year Treasury note) is available after 2004:10. The contribution of fundamentals
and ﬁrst lagged of excess speculation factors to oil price ﬂuctuations is about 19.8%
and 21.2% respectively.
Table 1.5 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations in Baseline speciﬁcation, including all 24 fundamental
variables and 11 speculative variables mentioned in the empirical methodology sec-
tion. The data on all fundamental variables and speculative variables, mentioned in
the empirical methodology section, are available after 2008:1. The contribution of
fundamentals is about 3.7% and the contribution of contemporaneous, ﬁrst lagged ,
and second lagged excess speculation factors to oil price ﬂuctuations is about 46.2%,
25.2%, and 18.1% respectively.
The results in all tables lay out a structural break in the contribution of fundamen-
tals and speculative activities to oil price ﬂuctuations after 2003, and an increased
contribution of speculators in the oil market after 2003 compared to before 2003.
1.7 Conclusion
The results in all of the speciﬁcations considered above lay out evidence of “excess
speculation” in the oil market after 2003, which solely originates from speculators’
activity, and it is not a function of fundamentals. The results show excess speculation
is the major driver of oil price ﬂuctuations after 2003.
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The potential channel through which speculators can impact the oil market and the
dynamics of futures and spot oil prices is through the hedging demand of producers.
Oil producers are risk-averse and speculators face capital constraints. When the cap-
ital constraints bind, this limits the ability of oil producers to hedge their production
against price risk, which exposes them to more price risk. This leads to greater volatil-
ity in oil price ﬂuctuations. Thus, in conclusion, if speculators buy lots of futures, and
capital constraints become binding, this might lead to greater volatility in oil price
ﬂuctuations. This, in turn, increases the asset volatility of oil producers, which leads
to an increase in the expected default frequencies of oil producers exposing them to
even more risk and default in the subsequent periods. Hence, the eﬀect can even be
explosive.
Moreover, there might be a case that the speculators’ activity creates further volatil-
ities by rolling their entire position forward. In this case, the limits on the ability of
oil producers to hedge their production have larger impacts on oil price ﬂuctuations
as a result of greater volatility induced by speculators.
The channel described above can be considered as excess speculation if unrelated to
fundamentals, and the results in this paper show evidence of that. The results imply
that this market should be regulated in order to restrict the inﬂuence of speculators’
activity on oil price dynamics, helping the oil market to function properly.
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Table 1.1: Baseline speciﬁcation. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess spec-
ulation factors to oil price ﬂuctuations, including 19 fundamental variables available for the
whole sample.
Dependent variable: log spot oil price changes 1986-2013 1986-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 2.99% 1.10% 8.28%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 3.32% 1.10% 9.26%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 4.05% 0% 2.27%
First lagged excess speculation factors 2.03% 0.33% 14.12%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 1.99% 1.08% 27.46%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 2 2 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 2 1 4
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 1
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil price ﬂuctuations accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(ΔOilt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(ΔOilt)
). The estimation includes 19 fundamental
variables available for the whole sample. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors (Ffund)
which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund). rs repre-
sents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information contained
in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally related to
speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) shows the dynamic process
between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of autoregressive process for static
fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund) at time t+ 1 as
of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static fundamental factors
Ffund.
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Table 1.2: Speciﬁcation 1. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations, augmenting two proxies of global economic activity to
fundamental variables in Baseline speciﬁcation.
Dependent variable: log spot oil price changes 1994-2013 1994-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 12.92% 3.65% 9.84%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 12.59% 8.49% 12.44%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 5.29% 0.10% 19.19%
First lagged excess speculation factors 3.69% 0.69% 13.21%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 5.11% 4.47% 16.17%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 4 4 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 4 5 5
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil price ﬂuctuations accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(ΔOilt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(ΔOilt)
). The sample starts from 1994 : 10 due to
availability of data on world industrial production. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors
(Ffund) which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund).
rs represents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information
contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally
related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) shows the dynamic
process between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of autoregressive process
for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund) at time
t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static fundamental
factors Ffund.
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Table 1.3: Speciﬁcation 2. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil price ﬂuctuations, augmenting world oil supply to fundamental variables in
Speciﬁcation 1.
Dependent variable: log spot oil price changes 1994-2013 1994-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 12.56% 2.08% 11.21%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 13.57% 4.73% 18.20%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 5.09% 0.02% 16.36%
First lagged excess speculation factors 4.10% 0.53% 12.62%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 5.09% 4.29% 18.10%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 4 3 3
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 4 5 4
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil price ﬂuctuations accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(ΔOilt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(ΔOilt)
). The sample starts from 1994 : 10 due to
availability of data on world industrial production. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors
(Ffund) which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund).
rs represents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information
contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally
related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) shows the dynamic
process between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of autoregressive process
for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund) at time
t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static fundamental
factors Ffund.
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Table 1.4: Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation factors to oil
price ﬂuctuations in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 22 fundamental variables.
Dependent variable: log spot oil price changes 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 19.80%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 19.84%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 19.52%
First lagged excess speculation factors 21.17%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 11.93%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 3
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 5
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil price ﬂuctuations accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(ΔOilt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(ΔOilt)
). The data on all three fundamental variables
including Real personal consumption expenditures, V IX, and a measure of liquidity (deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year Treasury note) are available
after 2004 : 10. The results are based on Baseline speciﬁcation including 22 fundamental variables.
rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors (Ffund) which span all the information contained in
the observed fundamental variables (Xfund). rs represents the number of excess speculation factors
(Fexspec) which span the part of information contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec)
unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic
fundamental factors (qf ) determines the order of autoregressive process for static fundamental fac-
tors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund) at time t+1 as of time t is found
by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static fundamental factors Ffund.
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Table 1.5: Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation factors to oil
price ﬂuctuations in Baseline speciﬁcation, including all 24 fundamental variables and 11
speculative variables mentioned in the empirical methodology section.
Dependent variable: log spot oil price changes 2008-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 3.75%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 3.75%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 46.20%
First lagged excess speculation factors 25.10%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 18.12%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 1
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 4
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil price ﬂuctuations accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(ΔOilt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(ΔOilt)
). The data on all 24 fundamental variables
and 11 speculative variables, mentioned in the empirical methodology section, are available after
2008 : 1. The results are based on Baseline speciﬁcation including 24 fundamental variables and
11 speculative variables. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors (Ffund) which span all the
information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund). rs represents the number of
excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information contained in the observed
speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally related to speculative ac-
tivities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) determines the order of autoregressive
process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund)
at time t + 1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static
fundamental factors Ffund.
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Appendix B
Proxies for Variables
Proxying for Fundamental Hedging Demand
As discussed in section 1.3, one of the components which aﬀects the futures return
in commodity markets besides the excess return on equities is the producers’ risk-
aversion which drives producers to hedge their production. Acharya et al. (2013),
analyzing 2400 ﬁrm quarterly reports, show that 69.8% of oil companies hedge their
production by going short and 1% of these companies initiate long positions.
Haushalter (2000) study the hedging policies of oil and gas producers over the 1992-
1994 period. He shows the extent of hedging is positively associated with ﬁnancial
leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total asset. This indicates risk man-
agement in oil companies to reduce the likelihood of ﬁnancial distress. Moreover,
Acharya et al. (2013) show that the degree of oil derivative hedging is positively
related to default risk measures, the Zmijewski (1984) score and expected default fre-
quency (EDF ). The likelihood that a ﬁrm defaults can be a guide about the ﬁrm’s
hedging demand and as a result, oil hedging demand can be proxied for by the default
risk of oil companies.
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Following Acharya et al. (2013), I employ both the Zmijewski (1984) score and EDF
as proxies for fundamental hedging demand of oil producers. Both fundamental credit
risk (Zmijewski-score), and structural credit risk (EDF ) are computed based on the
analysis of a ﬁrm’s balance sheets. The main diﬀerence between these two is that
Zmijewski-score is an accounting value-based, while EDF is a forward-looking mea-
sure of risk based on the market value.
I estimate the Zmijewski-score and EDF for oil and gas producer ﬁrms with SIC
code 1311 (490 ﬁrms) using the balance-sheet data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP )-Compustat database. Then I aggregate the ﬁrm’s Zmijewski-
score and EDF estimated to obtain an aggregate indicator of oil producers’ expected
default, and as a result, an aggregate indicators of overall producers’ hedging demand.
I ﬁnd the Zmijewski score employing the ﬁrm-level balance-sheet variables. Each
ﬁrm’s Zmijewski-score is calculated as follows.
Zmijewski− score = −4.3− 4.5∗NetIncome/TotalAssets (B.1)
+5.7∗TotalDebt/TotalAssets
−0.004∗CurrentAssets/CurrentLiabilities
The market-based measure of credit risk, which I employ, is the expected default
frequency (EDF ). I estimate the EDF for each ﬁrm applying the empirical method
used by Moody’s KMV .
Public ﬁrm expected default frequency EDF is one of the forward-looking prob-
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abilities of default estimates for publicly traded companies and is a modiﬁcation of
Merton’s approach for structural credit risk models considering more realistic assump-
tions. The EDF is a cardinal measure of credit risk, rather than a rank ordering of
credit risk.
It is motivated by the conceptual underpinning that default is highly likely to occur
when the market value of a ﬁrm’s assets is insuﬃcient to cover the book value of its
liabilities at some future date. In other words, the model computes the probability
of default as the probability that a ﬁrm’s assets will fall below its liabilities at a spe-
ciﬁc time horizon. Thus, structural credit risk (EDF ), like fundamental credit risk
(Zmijewski-score), is computed based on the analysis of a ﬁrm’s balance sheets. The
advantage, however, is that the EDF , by utilizing ﬁnancial market information on
ﬁrm’s value, provides an up-to-date measure of ﬁrm’s credit risk.
There are several diﬃculties in estimating the EDF , including estimating the market
value of ﬁrm’s asset and estimating the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets.
Following the empirical strategy of Moody’s KMV , I employ a four-step procedure
for estimating public ﬁrm EDF : (1) utilizing an iterative procedure to estimate the
asset value and the empirical volatility of ﬁrm’s asset; (2) computing the default point
for a one-year time horizon; (3) computing the ﬁrm’s distance to default (DD) using
the estimates from steps 1 and 2; (4) ﬁnding EDF from DD in step 3, based on
assumption of the normally distributed of DDs.
In Appendix C, in more details, I explain the theoretical underpinnings of the EDF ,
the diﬃculties in estimating the expected default frequency (EDF ) and the exact
feature of Moody’s KMVmethod for estimating EDF .
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Estimates for Volatility of Oil Futures Returns
I ﬁrst deﬁne the measure of oil futures returns. Following the methodology of Acharya
et al. (2013), I construct oil futures returns at the end of month t as the one-period
price percentage change in the nearest-to-maturity contract that would not expire
during the month t+ 1. Thus, the oil futures return is calculated as:
Ft+1,T − Ft,T
Ft,T
. (B.2)
where Ft,T is the oil futures price at the end of month t on the nearest contract that
expires after the end of month t + 1, at time T , and Ft+1,T is the price of the same
contract at the end of month t+ 1.
Then, I estimate the conditional variance (the forecasted or realized variance) at
time t of oil futures return from time t to t + 1 using the autoregressive conditional
heteroskedastic (ARCH) model introduced by Engle (1982). The conditional variance
of oil futures returns evolves according to the autoregressive process given by:
εˆ2t = α0 + α1εˆ
2
t−1 + α2εˆ
2
t−2 + α3εˆ
2
t−3 + νt. (B.3)
Table B.1: The realized variance at time t of oil futures returns.
Regressor εˆ2t−1 εˆ
2
t−2 εˆ
2
t−3
Dependent variable: variance at time t of oil futures returns (εˆ2t ) 0.1116 0.0701 0.2048
where εˆt is the error in forecasting (modeling) oil futures returns as an AR process.
As shown in table B.1, all of the coeﬃcients on the above unrestricted AR process
using squares of the estimated residuals are positive and νt is bounded from below
by −α0, insuring that the conditional variance is never negative. Moreover, the sum
of coeﬃcients are less than 1, ensuring that the process is covariance-stationary and
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stable.
Proxy for Speculator Risk Tolerance
Following Etula (2009) and Acharya et al. (2013), I consider a growth in intermedi-
aries’ (aggregate broker-dealer) assets relative to household asset growth as a proxy
for the speculator risk tolerance (speculator’ risk-aversion) in aggregate.
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Appendix C
The Challenges and the Detailed
Method for Estimating Firm
Expected Default Frequency
(EDF)
There are some diﬃculties for estimating the expected default frequency (EDF ), in-
cluding.
(1) Estimating the market value of ﬁrm’s asset: A company’s assets worth in
the balance sheet reﬂects the book value cost of the asset at the time of purchase less
accumulated depreciation. The book value of the asset does not show an up-to-date
value of the asset, which reﬂects the change in an asset’s potential to generate cash in
the future. Since markets are forward looking, they can provide a better alternative
for estimating the value of a ﬁrm, but a company’s assets do not trade on the market.
In this case, a company’s equity value, which trades on the market, can be employed
for estimating the unobservable market value of a company’s asset.
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(2) Estimating the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets: The default risk is higher for
the businesses which ﬁrm’s assets are more volatile. In this case, there is a higher
probability that the value of the assets fall below the book value of liabilities. The as-
set volatility is not measurable since the market value of a ﬁrm’s asset is unobservable.
The theory behind the EDF model for estimating market value and volatility of
asset is based on Black-Scholes-Merton structural model (Black and Scholes, 1973,
and Merton, 1974). It considers the following stochastic process for the dynamic of
market value of a ﬁrm’s assets
dA = μAdt+ σAAdW (C.1)
where μ is the expected growth rate of the ﬁrm’s asset value, σA is the asset volatility,
and W represent a standard Brownian motion.1 By the geometric Brownian motion
assumption, the log asset value is normally distributed
lnA1 = N
(
lnA0 + (
μ− σ2A
2
), σ2A
)
(C.2)
The likelihood that a ﬁrm’s asset value (A) fall below its default point (X, which is
computed based on the ﬁrm’s book value of liabilities) in the speciﬁc period,
1The standard Brownian motion is a continuous-time stochastic process of a random walk; Ran-
dom walk is a discrete process which is only deﬁned at integer values of t, while the standard
Brownian motion is deﬁned at a ﬁner and ﬁner grid of dates (continuous time) at which, the value
of this process, W (t), is continuous with probability of 1.
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Pr(lnA1 < lnX) is
Probabilityofdefault = Φ
[
− ln(
A
X
) + (μ− σ2A
2
)
σA
]
(C.3)
or by using the deﬁnition for the distance to default (DD) :
Probabilityofdefault = Φ[−DD] (C.4)
For simplicity, by dropping the second term of the numerator above, the DD can be
written as:
DD =
[
− ln(A)− ln(X)
σA
]
(C.5)
The distance to default or a ﬁrm incorporates three important pieces of information:
(1) the market value of assets; (2) the default point; and (3) the asset volatility. The
distance to default or a ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between expected market value of the
asset and the default point at speciﬁc horizon date in the future, standardized by
its asset volatility (its business risk); it is a single rank ordering static reﬂecting the
probability of a ﬁrm to default (shown by the black area below the default point in
Figure C.1).
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Figure C.1: Key Drivers of Firms’ EDF
A company’s unobservable asset value and asset volatility can be derived from its
equity market returns. The equity of a company can be considered the same as a
call option on the company’s assets. In this case, the Black-Scholes option pricing
formula for a call option relates the observable equity value to the unobservable asset
value and asset volatility for a ﬁrm which is ﬁnanced by equity and a zero-coupon
bond (X). Considering E as the value of equity, as the expected growth rate of the
ﬁrm’s asset value, and T as the time horizon, the Black-Scholes formula for the value
of equity is
E = A0Φ(d1)− e−rTXΦ(d2) (C.6)
where
d1 =
ln(A0
X
) + (r +
σ2A
2
)T
σA
√
T
(C.7)
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T (C.8)
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This formula relates the value of a ﬁrm’s equity (E) to its asset value (directly) and its
asset volatility (indirectly, through the normal distribution). Thus, the value of the
option, equity value, can be employed to infer the implied ﬁrm asset value and volatil-
ity. Then, the estimates of ﬁrm asset value and volatility can be used for computing
the ﬁrm’s distance to default formula (B.5), and probabilities of default formula (B.3).
Following the empirical strategy of Moody’s KMV , I employ a four-step procedure
for estimating Public ﬁrm expected default frequency (EDF ):
First: I utilize an iterative procedure to estimate the asset value and the empirical
volatility of ﬁrm’s asset. For an initial guess of asset volatility, I ﬁnd a time-series of
asset values using the asset value equation. Then, I ﬁnd the asset volatility of the as-
set values generated. I consider this new asset volatility for ﬁnding a new time-series
of asset values. I iterate this process until the diﬀerence between asset volatilities
estimated in two iterations is so small, or in other words, until the asset volatility
estimated converges. The time-series of asset values in the ﬁnal iteration consider as
the ﬁrm’s asset values.
Second: I compute the default point for a one-year time horizon, as 100% of short-
term liabilities plus one-half of long-term liabilities for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Third: I compute the ﬁrm’s distance to default (DD) according to Eq.C.5, using the
estimates of asset value and volatility, and the default point from steps 1 and 2.
Fourth: I ﬁnd EDF from DD in step 3, based on assumption of the normally
distributed of DDs, as a result of the geometric Brownian motion assumption for the
dynamic of asset values (Eq.C.1).
59
Chapter 2
Did Speculation Cause Variation in
Oil Risk Premia?
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2.1 Introduction
The literature lacks a general model of oil futures risk premia that incorporates the
notion of time-varying risk premia along with other explanations of oil price ﬂuctua-
tions. Indeed, it is not clear in the literature how to construct such a model.
Moreover, as discussed in section 1.2.1 of chapter 1, one of the six strands in the
literature on the role of speculation in the oil market, considers models in which the
risk premium in the commodity market evolves over time, and takes it as evidence of
speculative activities in oil futures market. Although time-varying risk premia might
be suggestive of the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial investors on oil futures markets, there is no
evidence of excess speculation based on these models.
It is critical to distinguish between two types of speculative activity, speculation and
“excess speculation” as mentioned in chapter 1. Speculation is closely related to
fundamentals, provides liquidity to oil markets, and helps the functions of price dis-
covery and risk transfer between the future and the present, while excess speculation
is not linked to changes in fundamentals, may prevent the oil market from functioning
properly generating changes in the dynamic of oil futures and spot prices unrelated
to fundamentals, and is only favorable from a private perspective.
This paper uses a new methodology to incorporate all possible explanatory variables
of oil risk premia, and then employs it to examine the contribution of fundamen-
tals and excess speculation to oil risk premia and to analyze if the contribution of
fundamentals and excess speculation to oil risk premia has evolved over the period
1986-2013.
In practice, I use a dynamic factor model (DFM) to capture the common component
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of ﬂuctuations in real activity in the economy (“fundamentals”) and overall specula-
tive activities by both pure speculators and oil companies. I then take the residual
from a regression of the speculation factors on the expectation of the fundamentals
factors. The residuals show the part of overall speculative activity which cannot be
explained by expectations of fundamentals, and are orthogonal to fundamental factor
by construction. I label the residuals “excess speculation” factors. Finally, I calculate
how much of the variation in oil futures risk premia is caused by each groups of these
orthogonal factors.
My paper contributes to the literature in two dimensions: First and more impor-
tantly, as a novel feature in the literature, I construct a model of oil risk premia
which addresses the existence of excess speculation. The methodology introduced in
this paper can be employed as a correct way for providing the evidence of an increased
speculative activities in recent years based on time-varying risk premia models. Sec-
ond, I augment other explanatory variables of oil price ﬂuctuations to the model of
oil risk premia
The results in this paper lay out evidence of “excess speculation” after 2003 based on
time-varying risk premia strand of the literature. As mentioned, this type of specu-
lation originates from pure speculators’ activity especially after 2003, and it is not a
function of fundamentals.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides an underpinning theory
about how I deﬁne and classify the variables into two groups of fundamentals and
speculation. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical methodology of the paper in detail.
Section 2.4 discusses the data sources. Section 2.5 lays out the results, and ﬁnally,
Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The Theoretical Underpinning for the Vari-
ables in the Empirical Methodology
For my method, deciding what variables to include in the dynamic factor model
(DFM) and classifying them as fundamental and speculation variables are crucial.
The futures risk premium reﬂects the compensation for the uncertainty perceived in
the oil market. Therefore, changes in uncertainty in the oil market provide informa-
tion on changes in oil risk premia. Variables which can gauge the extent of uncertainty
in the oil market provide me with the pool of potential explanatory variables for oil
risk premia. I then classify these variables into two groups, fundamental and specu-
lative variables.
Two sources of uncertainty in the oil market can be considered. One source of uncer-
tainty is in the situation of the whole economy, and this is measured by the business
cycle variables and is reﬂected in the excess market return. The business cycle vari-
ables thus can be considered as fundamental variables. The second source of uncer-
tainty is speciﬁc to the oil market, and can be measured by uncertainty in the demand
and supply of oil. Variables measuring this second source of uncertainty, capture the
overall activity of both groups of speculators, oil producers and pure speculators.
Hence, the speculative variables can be considered as variables that distort oil futures
risk premia from the risk-adjustment of equity holders and capture the impact and
interaction of two groups of speculators (pure speculators and oil producers) on oil
futures risk premia. Section 1.3 of chapter 1 discusses the theoretical underpinning
for these inclusion and classiﬁcation in detail.
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2.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical methodology discussed in section 1.4.3 of chapter 1, can be applied for
modeling time-varying risk premia along with other explanations of oil price ﬂuctu-
ations, and can address the existence of excess speculation based on these models.
Thus, below, I explain the empirical methodology for modeling risk premia.
Let Xt, t = 1, 2, ..., T , denote a (n×1) vector of observations on each variable at time
t. The vector of observations (Xt) can be partitioned as Xt = [X
′
fund,t, X
′
spec,t]
′
, where
Xfund,t is the (nf×1) vector whose elements correspond to measures of fundamentals,
and Xspec,t is the (ns×1) vector whose elements correspond to measures of speculative
activity. The information in each partition of the vector of observable variables Xt,
can be summarized by a set of latent factors. The (rf × 1) vector of “fundamental”
factors, Ffund,t, spans all the information contained in the observed vector Xfund,t,
with rf < nf . The second group of factors (excess speculative factors), denoted by
the (rs × 1) vector Fspec,t, spans the part of information contained in the observed
vector Xspec,t which is speciﬁcally related to speculative activities, with rs < ns.
A six-step estimation procedure is used to estimate and identify the fundamental
and excess speculation factors, which enables me to investigate the contribution of
each partition of observable variables (fundamental and speculative variables) to oil
futures return.
First: The (T × rf ) matrix of factors Ffund is estimated as the rst rf principle com-
ponents of the (T × nf ) data matrix Xfund, while the number of latent static factors
(rf ) is chosen according to the Bai and Ng (2002) method. These fundamental factors
(Ffund) capture the common trend between the ﬁrst partition of observable variables
(fundamentals variables) excluding the idiosyncratic trend which is speciﬁc to each
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of these variables. Hence, these fundamental factors summarize the real activity in
the economy.
Second: The number of dynamic factors (qf ) for the fundamental factors (Ffund) is
estimated using Amenguel and Watson’s (2007) procedure. The dynamic process of
the fundamental factors then can be described by the following autoregressive process:
[Ffund,t] = Φ(L)[Ffund,t−1] + [εf,t] (2.1)
Where Φ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L of ﬁnite order qf , with
qf denoting the number of dynamic fundamental factors, and εf is the (rf × 1) vec-
tor of reduced-form VAR disturbances with a covariance matrix Σ = E[εftε
′
ft]. The
VAR(qf ) model is estimated by OLS using the estimated static factors. Then, I ﬁnd
the estimated rf factors in Ffund at time t+ 1, which represent the expectation of rf
fundamental factors (Ffund) at time t+ 1 as of time t.
Third: Each column of the (T × ns) data matrix Xspec corresponding to the vector
of variables in Xspec,t, (the variables which summarize the speculative activities in the
economy) is regressed on the expectation of rf fundamental factors Ffund at time t+1
as of time t, Et(Ffund,t+1), estimated in the second step in Eq.16, with Eˆ denoting the
corresponding (T ×ns) matrix of OLS residuals. The residuals (Eˆ) are orthogonal to
the fundamental common factors, and capture the variation in speculative variables
which does not originate from real economic activity. The reason I consider the fun-
damental factors at time t+1 rather than time t, is that eﬃcient markets imply that
the speculators’ activities are formed based on the expectation of real activity in the
next period. Thus the expectation of change in the real activity variables in the next
period aﬀects the ﬂuctuation of speculative variables at time t.
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Fourth: The (T × rs) matrix of factors Fexspec is estimated as the ﬁrst rs principle
components of the data matrix Eˆ from the second step, and the number of latent
static factors (rs) is chosen according to the Bai and Ng (2002) method. Since the
residuals from the third step are orthogonal to fundamental factors (Ffund), the ex-
cess speculation factors (Fexspec) estimated in this step are orthogonal to Ffund by
construction and represent the common factor of speculators’ activities which is not
related to real economic activity.
Fifth: Assuming the relationship between oil futures return and the common factors
is linear, oil futures returns are regressed on the estimated orthogonal factors of
fundamental and excess speculation.
OilFuturesReturnt = βfFfund,t + βsFexspec,t + et (2.2)
Sixth: I decompose the variance of oil futures returns using the common factors
estimated and ﬁnd the relative contribution of each of these factors to oil futures
returns.
var(OilFuturesReturnt) = β
2
fvar(Ffund,t) + β
2
svar(Fexspec,t) + var(et) (2.3)
Variables Entering Dynamic Factor Model
The variables included in Xfund,t are macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables which
can be classiﬁed into four broad categories. These are economic activity indicators,
inﬂation indicators, risk-free interest rates, and ﬁnancial indicators.
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Included as economic activity variables are: (1) the diﬀerence of the civilian unemploy-
ment rate; (2) the log-diﬀerence of nonfarm payroll employment; (3) the log-diﬀerence
of industrial production index; (4) the diﬀerence in capacity utilization index; (5) the
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) diﬀusion index of activity in the manufac-
turing sector; (6) the log-diﬀerence of real personal consumption expenditures (retail
control category); (7) the log-diﬀerence of housing starts; (8) and the leading eco-
nomic indicator index.1
For variables capturing price dynamics, I consider two inﬂation indicators: (1) the
log-diﬀerence of the core CPI; (2) the log- diﬀerence of the core PPI.
To capture risk-free interest rates I use: seven interest rates which include the entire
term structure of interest rates. In particular, the eﬀective federal funds rate, and
constant maturity Treasury yields at 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, and
10 years. To obtain the approximate stationarity, I convert the nominal yields into
real terms.2
1The leading index predicts the six-month growth rate of the coincident index. In addition to the
coincident index, the models include other variables that lead the economy: housing permits (1 to
4 units), initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Man-
agement (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury
bond and the 3-month Treasury bill.
2Following Gilchrist et al. (2009), I employ both the realized inﬂation and survey measures of
inﬂation expectations to convert the nominal yields to real terms. The realized inﬂation is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the log of the core CPI price index and its value 12 months earlier. The
inﬂation expectation, collected by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF ), is at a quarterly
frequency and includes the 1-year and 10-years ahead expected CPI inﬂation. Thus, I obtain
the monthly estimates of inﬂation expectations from a linear interpolation of quarterly inﬂation
expectations. Moreover, the expected inﬂation for 2 years, 3 years and 5 years is calculated by using
the weighted average of 1-year ahead and 10-year ahead expected inﬂation. Simply, for calculating
the 3-year expected inﬂation, I use the weights of 0.7 and 0.3 respectively on 1-year ahead and
10-year ahead expected inﬂation. Then, the real federal funds rate is measured as the diﬀerence
between the nominal rate and realized inﬂation. The real 6-month Treasury yield is measured as
the diﬀerence between the nominal yield and the equally weighted average of the realized inﬂation
and the one-year ahead expected inﬂation. Remaining real Treasury yields, are obtained by the
diﬀerence between the nominal yields and the appropriate expected inﬂation rate discussed above.
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Finally, to capture ﬁnancial market activity I use: (1) the total value-weighted excess
market return; (2) the implied volatility on the S&P500 index options (V IX) to cap-
ture uncertainty in the equity market; (3) the diﬀerence between Moody’s Baa and
Aaa rated corporate bond yields to capture aggregate default risk in the economy and
expected excess returns on stocks and bonds; (4) the implied volatilities on Eurodol-
lar interest rate, a measure of uncertainty of movement in short-term interest rates;
(5) the implied volatilities on 10-year Treasury note futures, a measure of uncertainty
of movements in long-term interest rates; (6) the log-diﬀerence of the trade-weighted
exchange value of the dollar against major currencies; and (7) the diﬀerence between
the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year Treasury note, a measure of liquidity.
How do I measure speculative activity? As I explained in section 1.3, the futures
risk premium can be modeled in terms of the sum of the excess market return and
the futures excess return. In this case, the above fundamental variables summarizing
the real economy capture both excess market returns and some portion of futures
excess returns which respond to fundamentals. Speculative activity is explained by
the remaining part of the futures excess return.
The vector of Xspec contains 11 variables which reﬂect the information about spec-
ulators’ activity in the economy. They are: (1) the variation in the aggregate level
of fundamental hedging demand for oil, which can be proxied for by aggregate com-
modity producer default risk (EDF ); (2) the realized variance of oil futures returns
(RV ) as a variable for time variation in the quantity of risk in the commodity mar-
ket; (3) the implied crude oil volatility index (OVX), a measure of quantity of risk in
the commodity market; (4) the interaction between expected default frequency of oil
companies and the variance of oil futures returns (EDF×RV ); (5) the interaction be-
tween expected default frequency of oil companies and the implied crude oil volatility
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index (EDF ×OVX); (6) the variation in the aggregate level of fundamental hedging
demand, which can be proxied for by the Zmijewski-score (Zm score) by using the
ﬁrm-level balance-sheet variables; (7) the interaction between the Zmijewski-score
of oil companies and the variance of oil futures returns (Zm score × RV ); (8) the
interaction between the Zmijewski-score of oil companies and the implied crude oil
volatility index (Zm score×OVX); (9) the risk tolerance of speculators, which can
be proxied for by growth in intermediaries’ assets relative to household asset growth
as a measure of speculators’ ease of access to capital in aggregate (γ−1s ); (10) the in-
teraction between expected default frequency of oil companies and the risk tolerance
of speculators (EDF × γ−1s ); (11) the interaction between the Zmijewski-score of oil
companies and the risk tolerance of speculators (Zm score× γ−1s ).
Thus in the above baseline speciﬁcation, the vector Xfund contains 24 macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial time-series. The 11 elements of vector Xspec correspond to the variables
that can summarize the speculative activities in the economy. Recalling my proce-
dure, I ﬁrst ﬁnd the common factors of Xfund, and then extract the part of Xspec that
is orthogonal to Xfund. So it is only speculative activity unrelated to fundamentals
that I call “excess speculation”.
In addition to the baseline speciﬁcation, I consider two other speciﬁcations, including:
Speciﬁcation 1: I Incorporate global economic activity by including two proxies of
global economic activity in the vector Xfund,t. Following Juvenal and Petrella (2011),
the ﬁrst proxy which I consider is world industrial production and the second proxy
is dry cargo bulk freight rates as proposed by Kilian (2009).
Speciﬁcation 2: I Augment speciﬁcation 1 with world oil supply. In fact, I incorporate
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two proxies of global economic activity as well as world oil supply in the vectorXfund,t.
2.4 Data
The data spans the period 1986-2013 for most of series, while the data for some se-
ries is available only for a subset of the period. The data sources are mentioned in
section 1.5 and Appendix A. In addition, I construct proxies for some of the variables
described in Appendix B. The data and proxies for variables have been tested for sta-
tionarity and those which are integrated of order one (I(1)) have been transformed to
diﬀerence out unit roots and trends. Then, as is standard in using principal compo-
nent models, the data have been standardized to have mean zero and unit standard
deviation.
2.5 Empirical Results
The empirical results are shown in Table 2.1-2.5. It includes the results for diﬀerent
speciﬁcation discussed in section 2.3 and for diﬀerent sample periods based on the
data availability. To study how oil risk premia have evolved over time in response to
changes in fundamental and speculative activities, I also consider two distinct peri-
ods, before 2003 (subsample 1) and after 2003 (subsample 2). This can then show a
possible structural break in the contribution of fundamentals and speculative activi-
ties to oil risk premia.
Table 2.1 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil risk premia in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 19 fundamental variables
available for the whole sample period 1986-2013. The contribution of fundamentals
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is about 2.4% for the whole period, 0.54% for the subsample 1, and 7.1% for the sub-
sample 2. The contribution of second lagged of excess speculation factors to oil risk
premia is about 2.5% for the whole sample, 1.3% for the subsample 1, and 16.7% for
the subsample 2. The results show an increase in contribution of fundamental factors
and a surge in contribution of excess speculation factors to oil risk premia after 2003.
Table 2.2 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil risk premia in Speciﬁcation 1, augmenting two proxies of global eco-
nomic activity to fundamental variables in Baseline speciﬁcation. The sample period
changes to 1994-2013 due to availability of data on world industrial production. The
contribution of fundamentals is about 8.1% for the whole period, 6% for the subsam-
ple 1, and 8.4% for the subsample 2. The contribution of second lagged of excess
speculation factors is about 5.5% for the whole sample, 3.1% for the subsample 1,
and 13.1% for the subsample 2. The results show an increase in contribution of fun-
damental factors and excess speculation factors to oil risk premia after 2003.
Table 2.3 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil risk premia in Speciﬁcation 2, augmenting world oil supply to fundamen-
tal variables in Speciﬁcation 1. The contribution of fundamentals is about 7.9% for
the whole period, 2.1% for the subsample 1 (1994-2003), and 9% for the subsample 2
(2004-2013). The contribution of second lagged of excess speculation factors is about
5.6% for the whole sample, 3.4% for the subsample 1, and 14.7% for the subsample
2. The results show an increase in contribution of fundamental factors and excess
speculation factors to oil risk premia after 2003.
Table 2.4 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil risk premia in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 22 fundamental variables.
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The sample starts from 2004:10 since the data on three of the fundamental variables
including Real personal consumption expenditures, V IX, and a measure of liquidity
(deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year
Treasury note) is available after 2004:10. The contribution of fundamentals and ﬁrst
lagged of excess speculation factors to oil risk premia is about 13.1% and 19.5% re-
spectively.
Table 2.5 shows the estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil risk premia in Baseline speciﬁcation, including all 24 fundamental vari-
ables and 11 speculative variables mentioned in the empirical methodology section.
The data on all fundamental variables and speculative variables, mentioned in the
empirical methodology section, are available after 2008:1. The contribution of fun-
damentals is about 4.2% and the contribution of contemporaneous, ﬁrst lagged , and
second lagged excess speculation factors to oil risk premia is about 39.7%, 22.9%, and
20.1% respectively.
The results in all tables lay out a structural break in the contribution of fundamentals
and speculative activities to oil risk premia after 2003, and an increased contribution
of speculators in the oil market after 2003 compared to before 2003.
2.6 Conclusion
The results in all of the speciﬁcations, shown in Table 2.1-2.5, provide evidence of
excess speculative activities (inﬂuence of ﬁnancial investors) in oil futures markets
after 2003 based on time-varying risk premia models. The results can be taken as an
indicator of a structural change in oil futures markets in recent years.
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Table 2.1: Baseline speciﬁcation. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess spec-
ulation factors to oil futures returns, including 19 fundamental variables available for the
whole sample.
Dependent variable: oil futures returns 1986-2013 1986-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 2.36% 0.54% 7.05%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 2.59% 0.54% 6.96%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 3.27% 0.23% 0.37%
First lagged excess speculation factors 1.99% 0.15% 6.88%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 2.52% 1.31% 16.71%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 2 2 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 2 1 4
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 1
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil futures returns accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
). The estimation includes
19 fundamental variables available for the whole sample. rf shows the number of “fundamental”
factors (Ffund) which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental variables
(Xfund). rs represents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part
of information contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals
and speciﬁcally related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf )
shows the dynamic process between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of
autoregressive process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental
factors (Ffund) at time t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated
rf static fundamental factors Ffund.
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Table 2.2: Speciﬁcation 1. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess specula-
tion factors to oil futures returns, augmenting two proxies of global economic activity to
fundamental variables in Baseline speciﬁcation.
Dependent variable: oil futures returns 1994-2013 1994-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 8.11% 6.00% 8.42%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 9.18% 10.33% 9.57%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 3.80% 0.80% 15.84%
First lagged excess speculation factors 2.52% 0.30% 10.43%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 5.46% 3.05% 13.08%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 4 4 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 4 5 5
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil futures returns accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
). The sample starts from
1994 : 10 due to availability of data on world industrial production. rf shows the number of
“fundamental” factors (Ffund) which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental
variables (Xfund). rs represents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the
part of information contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals
and speciﬁcally related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf )
shows the dynamic process between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of
autoregressive process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental
factors (Ffund) at time t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated
rf static fundamental factors Ffund.
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Table 2.3: Speciﬁcation 2. Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation
factors to oil futures returns, augmenting world oil supply to fundamental variables in
Speciﬁcation 1.
Dependent variable: oil futures returns 1994-2013 1994-2003 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 7.90% 2.13% 9.02%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 9.78% 4.93% 11.08%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 3.66% 0.30% 14.95%
First lagged excess speculation factors 2.76% 0.09% 9.53%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 5.63% 3.40% 14.71%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 4 3 3
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 4 5 4
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3 1 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil futures returns accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
). The sample starts from
1994 : 10 due to availability of data on world industrial production. rf shows the number of
“fundamental” factors (Ffund) which span all the information contained in the observed fundamental
variables (Xfund). rs represents the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the
part of information contained in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals
and speciﬁcally related to speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf )
shows the dynamic process between the static fundamental factors by determining the order of
autoregressive process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental
factors (Ffund) at time t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated
rf static fundamental factors Ffund.
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Table 2.4: Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation factors to oil
futures returns in Baseline speciﬁcation, including 22 fundamental variables.
Dependent variable: oil futures returns 2004-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 13.08%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 14.08%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 12.34%
First lagged excess speculation factors 19.50%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 10.98%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 3
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 5
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 3
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil futures returns accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
). The data on all three
fundamental variables including Real personal consumption expenditures, V IX, and a measure of
liquidity (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 5-year swap rate and the yield on the 5-year Trea-
sury note) are available after 2004 : 10. The results are based on Baseline speciﬁcation including 22
fundamental variables. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors (Ffund) which span all the
information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund). rs represents the number of
excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information contained in the observed
speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally related to speculative ac-
tivities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) determines the order of autoregressive
process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental factors (Ffund)
at time t + 1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated rf static
fundamental factors Ffund.
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Table 2.5: Estimated contribution of fundamentals and excess speculation factors to oil
futures returns in Baseline speciﬁcation, including all 24 fundamental variables and 11
speculative variables mentioned in the empirical methodology section.
Dependent variable: oil futures returns 2008-2013
Contribution of fundamentals (Ffund)
Contemporaneous fundamental factors 4.19%
1-month ahead forecasted fundamental factors 4.19%
Contribution of excess speculation factors (Fexspec)
Contemporaneous excess speculation factors 39.65%
First lagged excess speculation factors 22.88%
Second lagged excess speculation factors 20.14%
Number of static fundamental factors (rf ) 2
Number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) 1
Number of static excess speculation factors (rs) 4
Notes: Contributions are the share of variance of oil futures returns accounted for by the latent
factors (as measured by
β2fvar(Ffund)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
and
β2svar(Fexspec)
var(OilFuturesReturnt)
). The data on all 24 funda-
mental variables and 11 speculative variables, mentioned in the empirical methodology section, are
available after 2008 : 1. The results are based on Baseline speciﬁcation including 24 fundamental
variables and 11 speculative variables. rf shows the number of “fundamental” factors (Ffund) which
span all the information contained in the observed fundamental variables (Xfund). rs represents
the number of excess speculation factors (Fexspec) which span the part of information contained
in the observed speculative variables (Xspec) unrelated to fundamentals and speciﬁcally related to
speculative activities. The number of dynamic fundamental factors (qf ) determines the order of
autoregressive process for static fundamental factors. 1-month ahead expectation of rf fundamental
factors (Ffund) at time t+1 as of time t is found by estimating the VAR(qf ) model for the estimated
rf static fundamental factors Ffund.
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